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b.     Whether there is evidence from which a reasonable 
       jury could conclude that the employees acted with the 
       manifest intent to obtain a financial benefit for 
       themselves or a third person (subsection b's 
       requirement) 
 
Given the standard of manifest intent described above, 
we turn our analysis to the specific requirements of 
subsection (a) and subsection (b) of the fidelity provision. 
As previously mentioned, the plain language of the fidelity 
provision covers only those losses caused by employee 
misconduct undertaken with the manifest intent (1) to 
cause a loss, and (2) obtain a certain type of financial 
benefit for the employee or a third person. Wefirst will 
address in this section the scope of the latter requirement, 
found in subsection (b) of the fidelity provision, because it 
informs the remainder of our analysis of the coverage 
issues raised in this appeal. 
 
At the outset, it is important to note that the plain 
language of that subsection indicates that an insured may 
meet its requirements in two ways. First, the insured may 
satisfy subsection (b) by demonstrating that the dishonest 
employee acted with the purpose of obtaining for himself or 
herself a financial benefit other than "salaries, 
commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions, awards, profit 
sharing, pensions or other employee benefits earned in the 
normal course of employment." Alternatively, the insured 
may meet the requirements of subsection (b) by showing 
that the dishonest employee acted for the purpose of 
obtaining for a third party a financial benefit not included 
within the list just enumerated. F&D contends that it is 
entitled to summary judgment because the individual 
defendants' actions do not satisfy either aspect of 
subsection (b). We will address its arguments separately 
below. 
 
i. Whether the evidence could support a finding that the 
individual defendants acted with the manifest intent to 
obtain a financial benefit for themselves "other than 
salaries, commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions, awards, 
profit sharing, pensions or other employee benefits earned 
in the normal course of employment" 
 
In the district court, the RTC contended that Hurst, 
Merkle and Ridder committed their fraudulent or dishonest 
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acts because they were motivated by a desire to obtain the 
golden handcuff payments, and that DeVany was motivated 
by his desire to receive a $1,000 payment at the close of the 
HonFed sale. See SA at 206-07. It also asserted that Hurst, 
Ridder and Merkle acted with the intent to obtain lucrative 
employment opportunities with HonFed. In response, F&D 
claims that there is no evidence indicating that Ridder, 
Hurst and Merkle acted with the manifest intent to obtain 
for themselves employment opportunities with HonFed or 
signing bonuses with that company. Focusing next on the 
plain language of the exclusionary clause in subsection (b), 
F&D argues that both the golden handcuff payments and 
the $1,000 payment constitute bonuses or awards. From 
that premise, F&D contends that because the plain 
language of subsection (b) excludes coverage for losses 
resulting from employee misconduct motivated by a desire 
to receive, inter alia, bonus payments and other forms of 
compensation from the insured, the employees' desire to 
obtain the handcuff payments does not provide a basis for 
indemnity. 
 
To reiterate, subsection (b) of the fidelity provision 
requires that the employee engage in the dishonest or 
fraudulent conduct with the manifest intent "to obtain 
financial benefit for the Employee . . . , other than salaries, 
commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions, awards, profit 
sharing, pensions or other employee benefits earned in the 
normal course of employment." App. at 562. As a matter of 
contract construction, it is evident that the clause 
beginning with "other than" is exclusionary. Thus, if the 
employee committed the fraudulent or dishonest act 
motivated only by a desire to gain one of the enumerated 
financial benefits for himself or herself, the insured could 
not recover under the fidelity provision, as the requirements 
of subsection (b) would not be satisfied. 
 
The district court held that the golden handcuff 
payments were not the type of financial benefits excluded 
under subsection (b) by adopting the following construction 
of the relevant language: 
 
       It is clear that the uniquely final `one-time only' nature 
       of these payments prevents them from being classified 
       as bonuses `earned in the normal course of 
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       employment.' F&D maintains that the clause precludes 
       coverage for acts done with the intent to obtain any 
       type of bonus, not just those earned in the normal 
       course of business. Although grammatically the phrase 
       `earned in the normal course of employment' modifies 
       `other employee benefits,' it is at least unclear whether 
       this clause intended to exclude coverage for dishonest 
       acts committed with an intent to obtain a one-time 
       payment such as the handcuff bonus in the context of 
       the generic thrust of excluded types of remuneration. 
       The litany of compensation kinds excluded from 
       coverage are all payments which are generally received 
       on a regular basis as part of an employee's 
       compensation scheme. The handcuff payments 
       certainly do not fall within that category. 
 
Op. at 26. Invoking the well-settled principle that courts 
resolve ambiguities in an insurance contract in favor of 
coverage and construe exclusions narrowly, the court found 
that the clause did not bar coverage for dishonest or 
fraudulent acts committed with the manifest intent to 
obtain the handcuff payments. 
 
In support of its construction of the exclusionary clause, 
F&D points out that "[c]ourts uniformly have construed the 
Bond's exclusion language for financial benefits to mean 
any payment that the insured voluntarily pays to an 
employee, even if those payments are fraudulently earned." 
Br. at 39. It explains that "[r]ecovery under a fidelity bond 
is barred if the employer `knowingly paid the disputed 
funds directly to the employees on the belief that the 
employees were entitled to the payments as compensation 
for honest work.' " Id. at 40 (quoting FDIC v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp. 1146, 1160 (M.D. Tenn. 
1990), aff'd in relevant part, 942 F.2d 1032 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
F&D also points to Auburn Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. 
Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 967 F. Supp. 475 
(M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 130 F.3d 444 (11th Cir. 1997) (table), 
where the court rejected the insured's argument that the 
phrase "earned in the normal course of employment" 
permits coverage under subsection (b) if the commissions 
the employee earned from his conduct were not "earned in 
the normal course of employment" in the sense that they 
 
                                52 
  
were obtained fraudulently. See id. at 478-79 (noting that 
the phrase "in the normal course of employment" serves 
only to define the type of excluded benefits andfinding that 
"[t]his phrase does not mean that allegedly dishonestly 
obtained commissions are included within the policy"). 
 
We agree with F&D's argument that the district court 
erred in finding that the phrase "earned in the normal 
course of employment" could be construed as precluding 
the "one-time payments" provided for in the closing 
agreements. In this regard, we believe that the district 
court's construction of the last phrase of subsection (b) 
"`strain[s] the language of the policy tofind an ambiguity 
where there is none in order to grant coverage that does not 
exist.' " Oritani Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 
989 F.2d 635, 639 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). In our 
view, the phrase "earned in the normal course of 
employment" is unambiguous, and thus, the presumption 
of construing the exclusion in the contract narrowly does 
not apply here. This conclusion compels us to find that the 
handcuff payments fall squarely within the definition of 
"bonuses" or "awards," or alternatively qualify as a type of 
benefit "earned in the normal course of employment." 
Accordingly, the RTC cannot satisfy subsection (b) by 
establishing that Ridder, Hurst and Merkle acted with the 
"manifest intent" of obtaining the golden handcuff 
payments for themselves.13 
 
Our analysis begins with a review of the plain language 
of subsection (b). First, we note that the position of the 
phrase "earned in the normal course of employment" 
strongly indicates that that phrase was meant to modify the 
language "other employee benefits," as the modifying 
language directly follows that phrase and describes the 
types of employee benefits falling within the exclusion. 
See id.; Hartford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co. v. Washington 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Parenthetically, we observe that with respect to the $1,000 "bonus" 
DeVany received after the HonFed closing, there simply is insufficient 
evidence in the record concerning the nature and character of the 
payment for us to determine in this appeal whether it falls within the 
exclusionary language in subsection (b). Notably, the district court's 
opinion did not address that issue, and we expressly leave that question 
unresolved. 
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Nat'l Ins. Co., 638 F. Supp. 78, 83 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (quoting 
Berger v. Fireman's Am. Loss Control Co., No. 508, slip op. 
(Md. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1982)). Moreover, as there is no 
comma between the two phrases, it is clear that they 
should be read together, so that the "earned in the normal 
course of employment" modifies only the general phrase 
"other employee benefits" rather than the other specific 
types of employee benefits previously enumerated. See 
Hartford Accident, 638 F. Supp. at 83. As one article 
explains: 
 
       Attempts to limit the exclusion to financial benefits 
       [such as salaries and commissions] earned in the 
       normal course of employment have been rejected. The 
       words `earned in the normal course of employment' do 
       not modify the enumerated exclusions that precede 
       them, but are intended to include in the list of 
       excluded benefits other benefits typically earned by 
       employees. 
 
Foster, et al., supra at 789. Thus, under the plain language 
of the bond, the phrase "earned in the normal course of 
employment" cannot be viewed as a limitation on the 
exclusion. Rather, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
drafters included the phrase to provide a broader exclusion, 
thereby shrinking the bounds of coverage under thefidelity 
provision. This construction clearly undermines the district 
court's reliance on the last phrase of the exclusionary 
clause to conclude that the handcuff payments were not 
within the exclusion. See Hartford Accident, 638 F. Supp. at 
83; see also Morgan, Olmstead, Kennedy & Gardner, Inc. v. 
Federal Ins. Co., 637 F. Supp. 973, 977 (S.D.N.Y.) 
(interpreting similar language and reaching same 
conclusion), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1986) (table). 
 
While recognizing that "earned in the normal course of 
employment" did not modify "bonuses" or"awards" per se, 
the district court found that language informative and 
demonstrative of the types of financial benefits that came 
within the exclusion. By relying on the phrase "earned in 
the normal course," its appears that the district court 
concluded that the one-time, final payments were not 
within the excluded financial benefits. The court's holding 
on this point thus rests upon its conclusion that the 
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unique, one-time nature of the payment distinguished it 
from the types of employee benefits set out in the 
exclusionary clause. 
 
We cannot agree with the district court's reasoning. Put 
simply, a review of the case law interpreting the purpose of 
the exclusionary language and the meaning of the phrase 
"earned in the normal course of employment" demonstrates 
that the court's conclusion on this point is contrary to most 
(if not all) of the decisions addressing this issue. 
Extrapolating from the cases we have found on point, we 
understand the exclusion found in subsection (b) to 
eliminate coverage where the insured's theory is that the 
employee's purpose in engaging in the misconduct that 
caused the loss was to receive some type of financial benefit 
that, generally speaking, the insured provides knowingly to 
its employees as part of its compensation scheme and as a 
result of the employment relationship.14  
 
(Text continued on page 57) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. See St. Paul Fire & Marine, 738 F. Supp. at 1160 (reviewing cases 
finding that coverage was precluded by the exclusionary clause, and 
noting that in each of them, "the employers [i.e., the insureds] knowingly 
paid the disputed funds directly to the employees on the belief that the 
employees were entitled to the payments as compensation for honest 
work"); see also Glusband, 892 F.2d at 210 (affirming judgment for 
insurer and noting that there was no evidence that the dishonest 
employee ever received any financial benefit other than salaries or 
commissions from insured, his employer, as a result of improper and 
speculative trading practices); Municipal Sec., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of 
N. 
Am., 829 F.2d 7, 9-10 (6th Cir. 1987) (affirming summary judgment for 
insurer where only evidence was that the employee obtained additional, 
unearned commissions from insured, her employer, as a result of 
improper conduct); Auburn Ford, 967 F. Supp. at 478 (same conclusion), 
aff'd 130 F.3d 444 (11th Cir. 1997) (table); Hartford Accident, 638 F. 
Supp. at 84 (stating that the last phrase "or other employee benefits 
earned in the normal course of employment" serves the useful purpose 
of distinguishing the entire list in part (b) from those financial 
benefits 
that, generally speaking, are "unearned" in the sense that they are not 
paid by the employer to the employee as part of the compensation 
scheme, but instead are obtained from payoffs, embezzlement schemes 
and other forms of theft); Verex Assurance, Inc. v. Gate City Mortgage 
Co., No. C-83-0506W, 1984 WL 2918, at **1-2 (D. Utah Dec. 4, 1984) 
(granting judgment to insurer because there was no evidence that 
employees intended to obtain a covered financial benefit; court noted 
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that the proofs indicated only that the loan officers decided to make 
loans to persons of questionable credit in order to collect commissions 
on the loans from their employer, the insured); Mortell v. Insurance Co. 
of N. Am., 458 N.E.2d 922, 929 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (finding that 
dishonest employees' only personal gain was improper commissions 
received from insured); Benchmark Crafters, Inc. v. Northwestern Nat'l 
Ins. Co., 363 N.W.2d 89, 91 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that 
employee's four months of salary and benefits he received as an 
employee of the insured before the insured's discovery of the fraud did 
not provide basis for coverage); First Philson Bank, N.A. v. Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co., 727 A.2d 584, 590 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (affirming summary 
judgment for insurer and holding that employee's receipt of shares of 
insured's stock through an employee stock option plan, along with 
various salary increases and bonuses from insured, constituted receipt 
of benefits "earned in the normal course of employment"), appeal denied, 
1999 WL 1255735 (Pa. Dec. 27, 1999); Dickson v. State Farm Lloyds, 
944 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex. App. 1997, no writ) (rejecting insured's 
coverage claim based on loss caused by employees' manipulation of time 
card system in order to obtain extra salary from insured); cf. James B. 
Lansing Sound, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 1560, 1567 
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding, in a suit for recovery on an employee dishonesty 
policy under which the insurer agreed to indemnify for loss of money, 
securities, or "other property" the insured sustained because of employee 
dishonesty, that the term "other property" did not permit the insured to 
recover commissions which it paid to an employee on fraudulent sales; 
court relied on language in dishonesty clause that excluded 
"commissions . . . or other benefits earned in the normal course of 
employment"); compare Lustig, 961 F.2d at 1167 (finding that district 
court erred in granting summary judgment to insured on issue of 
employee's manifest intent to obtain a covered financial benefit; in 
noting 
that evidence of employee's intent was mixed, court nevertheless 
observed that the proofs indicated that the employee received a $40,000 
"loan" from one of the bank's borrowers, ostensibly to show the 
borrower's good faith in an offer of future employment to employee); First 
Bank v. Hartford Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 997 F. Supp. 934, 937 (S.D. 
Ohio 1998) ("Courts have found indicia of manifest intent to obtain 
financial benefit outside the normal course of employment where an 
employee has a financial interest in the entity who benefits from the 
improper transaction."), aff'd on other grounds, 198 F.3d 245 (6th Cir. 
1999) (table); Estate of K.O. Jordan v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 
844 P.2d 403, 413 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (stating that employee 
obtained a financial benefit other than one"earned in the normal course 
of employment" when he embezzled trust funds and used them to cover 
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Following this approach, courts have explained that 
payments qualifying as "payoffs" or "kickbacks" fall outside 
the exclusionary clause, as well as financial benefits 
obtained as a result of the employee's interest in an entity 
that benefits from the improper transaction, because the 
payments in those instances clearly are not "salaries, 
commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions, awards, profit 
sharing, pensions or other employee benefits earned in the 
normal course of employment." See Lustig, 961 F.2d at 
1167 ($40,000 "loan" from borrower to employee); First 
Bank v. Hartford Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 997 F. Supp. 
934, 937-38 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff'd on other grounds, 198 
F.3d 245 (6th Cir. 1999) (table); Estate of K.O. Jordan v. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 844 P.2d 403, 413 (Wash. 
1993) (en banc). Moreover, courts have rejected the 
argument that the exclusion precludes coverage only for 
losses caused by an employee's desire to obtain, for 
example, honestly earned commissions, finding that the 
term "earned" encompasses financial benefits both 
fraudulently obtained and honestly earned from the 
employer. See Municipal Sec., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. 
Am., 829 F.2d 7, 9-10 (6th Cir. 1987); Auburn Ford, 967 F. 
Supp. at 479; Mortell v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 458 N.E.2d 
922, 929 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983). 
 
Thus, contrary to the district court's construction of the 
exclusion found in subsection (b), courts addressing its 
scope have held that the "earned in the course of 
employment" language is descriptive of the character of the 
payment at issue rather than the frequency with which the 
payment is received or the timing of its receipt. Indeed, this 
construction makes sense in view of the fact that each of 
the eight nouns preceding the last phrase "other employee 
benefits . . ." share the singular characteristic that they are 
all financial benefits provided knowingly by an insured, in 
its capacity as an employer, to its employees as a form of 
compensation and as a result of the employment 
relationship. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
operating expenses of company in which he was a shareholder, director, 
officer and employee). 
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We also point out that the very nature of bonuses and 
awards, both of which are excluded financial benefits under 
subsection (b), undermines the district court's limitation of 
the exclusion to only those payments received with 
frequency, or at a minimum more than once. Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary defines a "bonus" as 
"something given or received that is over and above what is 
expected." Id. at 252. Similarly, Webster's Seventh New 
Collegiate Dictionary defines an "award" as "something that 
is conferred or bestowed: prize." Id. at 61. Thus, if 
presented in the employment context, bonuses and awards 
are given by an employer to its employee as rewards based 
on job-related performance. By their very nature, those 
rewards are bestowed sparingly, perhaps only once in an 
employee's career. Nevertheless, under the plain language 
of the bond, a loss motivated by a desire to obtain such 
benefits falls squarely within the exclusion found in 
subsection (b). 
 
Thus, we cannot agree with the district court's reasoning 
that the last phrase "earned in the normal course" indicates 
that the excluded benefits are limited to those forms of 
compensation that are given by the employer to the 
employee on a "regular basis." Rather, we hold that the 
exclusion covers payments knowingly made by the insured 
to the employee as a consequence of their employment 
relationship and in recognition of the employee's 
performance of job-related duties. Applying this standard 
here, we find that the golden handcuff payments fall 
squarely within the exclusion set forth in subsection (b), 
whether it be because they are considered a "bonus," 
"award," or simply a financial benefit that the employees 
"earned in the normal course of employment." 
 
We point out that the closing agreements describe the 
payments thereunder as "compensation" for the employees' 
assistance in City Collateral sale, SA at 153, which 
suggests to us that the payments were bestowed once and 
only to certain employees in recognition of their job-related 
performance. We also note that the fact that the closing 
agreements provided for a singular, lump-sum payment 
actually supports the finding that the payments qualify as 
a bonus or award, given the ordinary meaning of those 
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terms. Moreover, these payments clearly are distinguishable 
from the those financial benefits which have been held to 
fall outside the category of excluded benefits, namely 
payoffs or embezzled funds, as City Collateral voluntarily 
signed the agreements knowing that the payments would 
be made if the sale eventually occurred. Indeed, City 
Federal paid the employees once the HonFed deal closed. 
Compare St. Paul Fire & Marine, 738 F. Supp. at 1160-61; 
Morgan, Olmstead, 637 F. Supp. at 978 (noting that bribes 
would not qualify as "salary, commissions, fees or other 
emoluments," which was the operative exclusionary 
language). 
 
Nevertheless, given our construction of the exclusion, it 
appears that it would not preclude coverage under the 
theory that Ridder, Hurst and Merkle engaged in dishonest 
and fraudulent acts with the manifest intent to secure 
future lucrative employment opportunities, salaries and 
signing bonuses from HonFed--a third party to their 
employment relationship with City Collateral.15 Indeed, F&D 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We point out in this regard that we have considered but rejected an 
alternative construction of the language of the exclusionary clause-- 
namely that it would apply regardless of whether the employee obtained 
the excluded financial benefits from the insured or a potential future 
employer who is a third party to the insured/employee relationship. Not 
surprisingly, we have been unable to find any cases addressing this 
issue. We think it clear, however, that the exclusionary clause precludes 
coverage only where the employee is motivated by a desire to obtain from 
his or her current employer, i.e., the insured, the enumerated financial 
benefits. See supra note 14. Such a construction is consistent with the 
drafters' intent in limiting the types of risks that will be covered under 
Insuring Agreement A. See generally Robin V. Weldy, A Survey of Recent 
Changes in Financial Institutions Bonds, 12 Forum 895 (1977) 
(describing dishonesty clause as covering losses resulting from a distinct 
type of human failing, and excluding all other losses caused by 
employees' "undesirable traits" from coverage): 
 
        Certain types of financial benefit earned in the course of 
       employment are not recognized. . . . In general, these benefits 
would 
       be those earned in the normal course of employment. For example, 
       an incompetent employee earns a salary while concealing the nature 
       and extent of his disastrous errors. Simple fear of unemployment is 
       the undesirable trait here. It's not a covered peril. A head teller 
in 
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apparently concedes that even under its construction of the 
exclusionary clause, which we found persuasive, benefits 
such as future employment, salaries and bonuses from 
HonFed would not fall within the exclusionary clause in 
subsection (b). Instead, it argues that the inference that the 
employees acted with the manifest intent to obtain different 
and more lucrative employment is "factually unsupportable" 
because it is undisputed that HonFed did not seek their 
employment with the company until November 1988. Thus, 
as we understand F&D's argument, it challenges the 
district court's assessment of the sufficiency of the RTC's 
evidence to survive summary judgment on this theory. 
 
We disagree with F&D's argument that no reasonable 
jury could conclude, based on the evidence, that Ridder, 
Hurst, and Merkle acted with the purpose of obtaining for 
themselves more lucrative employment elsewhere, including 
large salaries and bonuses with the prospective purchaser. 
Indeed, we believe that a reasonable jury couldfind that 
these employees, in engaging in their course of concealment 
and misrepresentation, intended to secure employment 
bonuses and future employment with City Collateral's 
purchaser. As the district court noted, Hurst testified that 
the officers sought to " `maximize their rewards' in 
connection with the sales effort and targeted potential 
purchasers who would likely employ them after the 
transaction." Op. at 25. Put simply, the fact that Ridder, 
Hurst and Merkle did not learn until November 1988, that 
they in fact obtained what they had hoped for all along (in 
terms of lucrative employment, salaries and bonuses with 
the purchaser) is not logically inconsistent with the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       a bank is promoted to loan officer and is aware that future 
       promotions and raises are dependent on increasing loan activity. To 
       increase loans and receive a normal financial benefit (raise and 
       promotion) the loan officer ignores standing lending instructions 
and 
       many loans go bad. Again, there is no covered loss in this 
situation. 
 
Id. at 897. Indeed, it is apparent from this passage that the focus must 
be on the wrongdoer's status as an employee of the insured at the time 
of the dishonest conduct causing the loss. Thus, the relevant 
employment relationship is that of the insured and the employee, rather 
than the employee and a prospective employer. 
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proposition that they engaged in a course of concealment 
and misrepresentation prior to that date to secure that 
ultimate result. 
 
We also point out that there is a suggestion in the record 
that as of late October or early November 1988, Ridder, 
Hurst and Merkle were confident that HonFed was going to 
purchase City Collateral, and that they began negotiating 
the terms of their future employment with the company 
around the same time period. In determining the 
employees' "manifest intent" to obtain future employment 
and signing bonuses, the jury certainly could consider the 
events that occurred subsequently to that date, in 
particular the December 9, 1988, memorandum to HonFed, 
and the fact that the individual defendants continued their 
course of concealment through the date of the sale. These 
events would be particularly probative on this issue, given 
the circumstance that as of that time frame, Ridder, Hurst 
and Merkle were certain to gain future employment, 
substantial salaries and signing bonuses if the sale 
occurred smoothly and on terms that were favorable to 
HonFed. In that sense, then, Merkle, Ridder and Hurst's 
chances for financial prosperity were tied to HonFed's 
ultimate success, which inevitably would come at City 
Federal's expense. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that at trial, the RTC may seek to 
establish coverage under the bond by proving that in 
engaging in the various acts of concealment and 
misrepresentation, Ridder, Hurst, and Merkle acted with 
the purpose of securing for themselves lucrative 
employment opportunities, salaries and bonuses with City 
Collateral's eventual purchaser. However, it cannot seek to 
establish coverage by arguing that these employees acted 
with the intent to secure the golden handcuff payments 
from City Collateral, as those payments qualify asfinancial 
benefits falling within the exclusionary clause in subsection 
(b). 
 
ii. Whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the 
individual defendants acted with a manifest intent to 
secure a financial benefit for a third party 
 
We noted at the outset of our discussion that subsection 
(b) of the fidelity provision could be satisfied in two ways. 
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The second way that an insured could obtain coverage is if 
the loss resulted directly from the employee's desire to 
obtain a financial benefit for a third party, in this instance 
HonFed. F&D contended before the district court that it 
was illogical to assume that the individual defendants 
began their course of conduct in May 1988 with the 
manifest intent to benefit HonFed because HonFed did not 
come into the picture until November 1988, long after the 
individual employees allegedly began their dishonest and 
fraudulent conduct. The district court agreed with F&D's 
argument, holding as follows: 
 
       In addition, no rational juror could find that the 
       officers fraudulently concealed information from City 
       Federal beginning in May 1988 with the manifest 
       intent to benefit HonFed, a potential purchaser which 
       only expressed interest in City Collateral months later. 
       Although the December 9 memorandum was likely 
       motivated by the desire to ensure that City Collateral 
       passed to HonFed on favorable terms, the entire course 
       of dishonesty and concealment perpetuated by the 
       officers during the prior months cannot be attributed 
       to this purpose. 
 
Op. at 24. 
 
The RTC does not challenge this ruling on appeal. For 
our purposes, we need not address whether the district 
court's analysis on this point was correct because we 
already have determined that the RTC may establish 
coverage under subsection (b) by proving that Ridder, 
Hurst, and Merkle acted with the manifest intent to secure 
future employment and bonuses with HonFed. Therefore, 
we will not disturb the district court's finding on this point. 
 
c.     Whether there is sufficient evidence from which a 
       reasonable jury could conclude that the employees 
       acted with the manifest intent to cause City Federal to 
       sustain a loss on the Northwest account (subsection 
       (a)'s requirement) 
 
F&D asserts alternatively that there is insufficient 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that 
the individual defendants acted with the manifest intent to 
cause City Federal to incur a loss on the Northwest 
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account. F&D points out that the quintessential example of 
an employee who undoubtedly possesses a manifest intent 
to cause the insured's loss is the embezzling employee-- 
"the thief"--because in that situation the employee's gain is 
always at the employer's expense. It contends that the only 
conclusion permitted by the evidence is that the employees 
hoped to save City Federal from large losses on the 
Northwest account. Accordingly, it asserts that we should 
affirm the district court's order of summary judgment 
because, as a matter of law, the evidence could not support 
the conclusion that the employees intended to cause City 
Federal's loss. 
 
The district court found that there was a triable issue 
concerning the employees' manifest intent to injure City 
Federal, explaining that "the evidence supports an inference 
that the employees concealed the true problematic status of 
the Northwest credit line to induce City Federal to approve 
extensions of the credit line and to consent to the 
advancement of additional funds from April to December 
1988." Op. at 22. Moreover, the court pointed out that the 
evidence demonstrated that the individual defendants, 
either individually or collectively, were well aware of the 
nature and severity of the problems with the credit line, yet 
took affirmative steps to misrepresent and conceal them 
from City Federal. Relying also on the other circumstantial 
evidence of intent, including the concealment of the 
Movroydis admission, the alteration of the customer 
history, and the advisory memorandum to HonFed on the 
eve of sale, the court found that a factfinder"could 
certainly conclude that the employees knew that the 
significant losses were `substantially certain to follow' from 
their conduct and that they acted with total disregard for 
these inevitable consequences." Id. 
 
F&D contests the court's holding on two grounds. First, 
it contends that the district court's reasoning is unsound 
because "it makes no sense that the employees would 
cause [City Federal] to lose millions of dollars because that 
loss would assist the employees in obtaining thefinancial 
benefits." Br. at 48. It contends that "creating a loss would 
not have assisted the employees in receiving their bonuses 
from [City Federal.]" "If anything, and by the FDIC's own 
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admission, the Employees could have been terminated if 
they had been caught purposely creating a loss on the 
Northwest loan." See id. at 49. 
 
Second, F&D argues that the district court ignored the 
undisputed evidence in the case demonstrating that the 
individual defendants extended the Northwest credit line 
beyond its initial maturity date in an attempt to minimize 
the losses that City Federal would incur. Moreover, F&D 
points out that the evidence also shows that over the 
course of the summer of 1988, the credit line showed some 
improvement, thus demonstrating that the employees acted 
solely with the best interests of City Federal in mind. In 
addressing the alleged acts of concealment, F&D contends 
that they do not undercut the other evidence of the 
employees' good intentions, as the RTC has failed to show 
how the employees intended to harm City Federal by hiding 
these problems. See id. at 49. 
 
We have made a complete study of the record of this case 
to determine whether there is sufficient evidence from 
which a jury could conclude that Ridder, Hurst, and Merkle 
acted with the purpose or desire of causing City Federal to 
sustain a loss on the Northwest account. While we do not 
set forth at this point all of the evidence the RTC presented 
on this issue and explain our analysis of it, we are in 
complete agreement with the district court's ultimate 
conclusion that the circumstances present a genuine issue 
of material fact concerning their manifest intent to cause 
City Federal to sustain the Northwest loss. Given the 
unique facts of this case, there are many possible 
conclusions that could be drawn concerning the employees' 
purpose. For example, there is evidence tending to show 
that Ridder, Hurst and Merkle acted with the desire of 
benefitting themselves, and consequently also desired to 
cause City Federal's loss, inasmuch as City Federal's loss 
would inure to their benefit. Clearly, HonFed's last minute 
decision to exclude the Northwest account from the 
purchase was beneficial to them because it ensured that 
their new employer would not be saddled with the loss with 
which they arguably were involved on some level. On the 
other hand, the jury could conclude that the loss was the 
unfortunate result of a series of poor business decisions, or 
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that in seeking to obtain future employment and associated 
benefits with HonFed, Ridder, Hurst and Merkle only 
intended to benefit themselves and that the injury to City 
Federal was an unintended consequence. Moreover, we 
cannot discount the possibility that at some point, their 
motivation and desires changed. In any event, the evidence 
pertaining to the employees' intent is mixed, and coverage 
therefore is a disputed issue of fact that should be left for 
the jury. See Lustig, 961 F.2d at 1166-67. 
 
Inasmuch as we have held that a jury may consider 
evidence tending to establish an employee's reckless 
behavior, as well as circumstantial proof of the substantial 
likelihood of a loss, and infer from those circumstances an 
intent to cause a loss, we believe that the facts of this case 
are such that a reasonable jury could draw the conclusion 
that the employees intended for City Federal to be saddled 
with the Northwest loan loss. Indeed, as we have explained, 
we simply cannot state with certainty what the employees 
intended in engaging in the acts that they did. Accordingly, 
we agree with the district court's ultimate conclusion that 
summary judgment on this issue was inappropriate. 
 
We have considered in this regard F&D's argument that 
the district court ignored the circumstantial evidence 
supporting the conclusion that the employees' actions were 
not undertaken with the manifest intent to cause City 
Federal's loss on the Northwest account. To be sure, F&D 
is correct that a reasonable jury could conclude, based on 
certain evidence in the record, that the employees only 
hoped to save City Federal from incurring a substantial loss 
in connection with the overflow of shipped and warehoused 
loans. Nevertheless, there is other evidence in the record, 
namely the various acts of concealment, which supports 
the opposite conclusion. Put simply, a jury would be 
required to consider all of the evidence in reaching its 
ultimate finding regarding the employees' subjective intent 
in engaging in the conduct that they did, and we will not 
pretermit the jury's ability to do so. 
 
Similarly, we have considered F&D's alternative 
argument, namely that "it makes no sense that the 
employees would cause [City Federal] to lose millions of 
dollars because that loss would assist the employees in 
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obtaining the financial benefits." Br. at 48. It claims that 
logically, if the individual defendants purposely created a 
loss on the Northwest account, it would not have benefitted 
them at all personally because it would be likely that City 
Federal would have fired them if it discovered that they 
purposely did so. In that event, Ridder, Hurst, and Merkle 
would not have been able to obtain lucrative employment 
with HonFed or collect on their closing agreements with 
City Collateral. See id. 
 
This assertion does not persuade us that no reasonable 
jury could find that these employees acted with the 
manifest intent to cause City Federal to sustain a loss. 
First, we note that this argument, in essence, asks us to 
view the facts in the light most favorable to F&D, and draw 
subjective conclusions in its favor, a task that we cannot 
perform at this juncture. We believe, however, that F&D's 
contention is best left for the jury's consideration. We also 
point out that this argument is premised on F&D's 
assumption that the RTC's theory is that the individual 
defendants purposely "created" a loss on the Northwest 
account. But it seems clear to us that the RTC does not 
claim that individual defendants "created a loss" in the 
sense that they assisted Movroydis in his kiting scheme. 
Rather, the RTC's position is that the employees"caused" 
the loss to City Federal because their acts of concealment 
and various misrepresentations led HonFed to exclude the 
loan from the sale, which in turn resulted in City Federal 
being put in the unfavorable position of having to deal with 
a delinquent account that was certain to result in a 
significant loan loss. Inasmuch as subsection (a) of the 
fidelity provision requires only that the employees acted 
with the manifest intent "to cause" the insured to sustain 
the loss that it did, the RTC's theory of coverage falls 
squarely within its relatively narrow parameters. 
 
In sum, we are convinced that the evidence is not so one- 
sided so as to compel the conclusion that, as a matter of 
law, Ridder, Hurst and Merkle did not intend to benefit 
themselves and cause City Federal to sustain a loss. 
Consequently, we will not disturb the district court's 
conclusion that summary judgment on this issue was 
inappropriate. 
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2.     Whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
       whether the Northwest loss is a loss "resulting directly" 
       from the employees' dishonest or fraudulent acts 
 
As its final argument, F&D contends that the district 
court erred in concluding that a reasonable jury could find 
that the employees' misconduct caused the Northwest loan 
loss. The district court construed the causation language-- 
"resulting directly from"--as meaning that the bond covers 
losses that would not have occurred "but for" the dishonest 
conduct. See Op. at 23 (citing Lustig, 961 F.2d at 181 [sic]). 
The court found that the evidence was sufficient to survive 
F&D's summary judgment motion on this point because it 
suggested that the extensions of credit and the additional 
loans made after the original maturity date "at the very 
least enhanced the losses" City Federal suffered. Id. The 
court concluded that "while the deterioratingfinancial 
condition of Northwest and Movroydis's kiting scheme 
certainly contributed to the losses, a fact-finder could 
reasonably conclude that the concealment by the officers of 
the problematic status of the credit line in order to induce 
the approval of future loans and extensions directly 
resulted in a covered loss." Id. 
 
F&D does not contend that the district court's "but for" 
standard was incorrect, but instead maintains that the RTC 
has not produced any evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could conclude that the employees' misconduct was 
the cause in fact of the loss, given the reality that it was 
likely that City Federal would have sustained the same or 
similar loss absent the fraudulent and dishonest actions. 
F&D asserts that, under general principles of tort law, an 
actor's conduct cannot be said to be a cause in fact of the 
resulting damage if the evidence shows that the injury 
would have resulted anyway even in the absence of the 
conduct at issue. In support of applying this rule to bar 
coverage in this case, F&D relies on tort cases discussing 
the concept that a plaintiff asserting a fraud claim must 
demonstrate that the fraudulent conduct caused an injury, 
and it analogizes to cases which held that there is no tort 
without an injury. See id. at 56 (citing Midwest Commerce 
Banking Co. v. Elkhart City Ctr., 4 F.3d 521, 524-25 (7th 
Cir. 1993); Stromberger v. 3M Co., 990 F.2d 974, 976-77 
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(7th Cir. 1993); Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 
1496 (2d Cir. 1992); Schroth v. Coal Operators Cas. Co., 73 
A.2d 67, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950)). 
 
From this premise, F&D argues that the RTC failed to 
meet its evidentiary burden at summary judgment because 
it did not introduce any evidence tending to show that, 
absent the individual defendants' pattern of concealment 
and misrepresentation, City Federal would have avoided the 
loss on the Northwest account. Br. at 55-63. F&D points to 
the fact that the RTC's expert could not quantify with a 
reasonable degree of certainty what funds were available to 
pay off the advances outstanding on the Northwest loan at 
any particular time. F&D's argument thus is premised on 
its belief that the district court's factual cause or "but for" 
analysis was flawed in that no reasonable jury could 
conclude that the employees' dishonest or fraudulent 
conduct played any part in the loan loss that forms the 
basis of the RTC's indemnification claim. 
 
Our analysis of this issue must begin by determining the 
appropriate causation standard, given the plain language of 
the bond. That finding will permit us to consider whether 
the evidence in record is sufficient to establish that there is 
a jury issue on causation. 
 
As to the first issue, we do not share F&D's view that the 
phrase "losses resulting directly from" requires only an 
inquiry into the factual cause of the loss. Indeed, it appears 
that in assuming that the language "resulting directly from" 
requires only a "but for" or "cause-in-fact" standard of 
causation, F&D has not considered our opinion in Jefferson 
Bank v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 965 F.2d 1274 
(3d Cir. 1992), which addressed the appropriate 
construction of the identical phrase under Pennsylvania 
law. There we construed the "resulting directly from" 
causation language in Insuring Agreement E--the forgery 
provision--and concluded that that phrase meant"losses 
proximately caused by." See id. at 1280-81. In reaching our 
conclusion, we specifically noted the insured's argument 
that the bond's language indicated that the causation 
standard was "broader" than proximate cause, and that the 
standard was a more lenient one, requiring only that the 
forgery be the "cause-in-fact" or the "but-for" cause of the 
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loss. See id. at 1280-81 & n.10. Our analysis rejected the 
insured's broader construction, as we found that the 
conventional proximate cause standard was the correct 
formulation. We also rejected the insurer's argument that 
the language of the bond required the plaintiff to prove not 
only proximate cause, but also some additional closeness in 
space and time between the loss and the cause of the loss. 
See id. at 1280-81 & n.11. 
 
Our research reveals that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
has not addressed the meaning of the phrase "losses 
resulting directly from" as it is used throughout the various 
Insuring Agreements contained in the Standard Form No. 
22 bond at issue in this case, and in particular has not 
construed the meaning of that language as it is used in the 
fidelity provision. Nevertheless, our review of several New 
Jersey cases interpreting and applying similar causation 
language in other types of insurance agreements indicates 
to us that the New Jersey Supreme Court would follow our 
opinion in Jefferson Bank and apply the proximate 
causation standard to the "resulting directly from" language 
found in the fidelity provision of this bond. See, e.g., Cruz- 
Mendez v. ISU/Ins. Servs., 722 A.2d 515, 525 (N.J. 1999) 
(stating that statute, in using the terms "caused" and "by 
reason of," contemplates proof of proximate causation) 
(citing Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Cos., 312 
A.2d 664, 669 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), aff'd, 319 
A.2d 732 (N.J. 1974) (per curiam), which observed that 
phrases "caused by" and "resulting from" in insurance 
contracts convey idea of proximate cause); Search EDP, Inc. 
v. American Home Assurance Co., 632 A.2d 286, 289-90 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (applying proximate cause 
standard where errors and omissions policy covered 
damages "resulting from" wrongful act where wrongful act 
"arises out of" conduct of insured's business) (citing 
Franklin Pack'g Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 408 A.2d 
448 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)); Stone v. Royal Ins. 
Co., 511 A.2d 717, 719-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) 
(interpreting language describing coverages and exclusions 
under homeowner's insurance policy where policy covered 
"direct loss . . . caused by," inter alia, accidental discharge 
or overflow of water, and excluded losses "directly or 
indirectly from" water damage; court applied proximate 
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cause standard to determine if water damage was covered 
by policy, and determined that last event contributing to 
the damage--the ruptured hose on the sump pump--was a 
covered risk); see generally Karadontes v. Continental Ins. 
Co., 354 A.2d 696, 697 n.1 (Bergen County Dist. Ct. 1976) 
(noting that "direct loss" as used in fire insurance policies 
has been construed to have essentially the same meaning 
as proximate cause); Stephen M. Brent, Annotation, What 
Constitutes "Direct Loss" Under Windstorm Insurance 
Coverage, 65 ALR 3d 1128 (1975) (noting that courts have 
equated "direct result" with "proximate cause of loss"); 7 
Couch 3d, supra S 101:53 ("The term `direct loss' is 
generally held to be the equivalent of both `proximate 
cause,' and `direct cause.' ") (citations omitted). 
 
Indeed, our result in Jefferson Bank was predicated upon 
our review of Pennsylvania case law addressing the 
meaning of a similar causation standard utilized in a 
different type of insurance contract, see Jefferson Bank, 
965 F.2d at 1281, and our construction of the language 
"losses resulting directly from" comports with other 
jurisdictions addressing this issue in the fidelity insurance 
context. See, e.g., Mid-America Bank v. American Cas. Co., 
745 F. Supp. 1480, 1485 (D. Minn. 1990) (utilizing 
proximate cause principles in addressing defendant's 
argument that the losses caused by the renewal of loans 
are not losses "directly resulting from" the employee's 
dishonest or fraudulent acts); Hanson PLC, 794 P.2d at 73 
(stating that trial court did not err in instructing jury that 
"result directly" language in fidelity bond may be defined as 
proximate cause). But see Fidelity & Deposit Co., 45 F.3d at 
976 ("Lustig requires that the FDIC show that a loan would 
not have been made `but for' the fraudulent conduct of the 
employee."); Lustig, 961 F.2d at 1167 ("A loss is directly 
caused by the dishonest or fraudulent act within the 
meaning of the bond where the bank can demonstrate that 
it would not have made the loan in the absence of fraud."); 
see generally William T. Bogaert, Andrew F. Caplan, 
Computing the Amount of Compensable Loss under the 
Financial Institution Bond, 33 Tort & Ins. L.J. 807, 813-14 
& nn.29 & 33 (Spring 1998) (criticizing approach 
in Jefferson Bank as adopting causation standard that was 
too lenient given the plain language of bond which required 
 
                                70 
  
that the connection between the loss and the conduct be 
"direct," and noting still that the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit's approach in Lustig "departed even further 
from the contractual language by allowing recovery based 
upon mere `but for' or factual causation in apparent 
disregard of the direct loss requirement and the proximity 
of the covered conduct and the loss"). 
 
Thus, as a matter of logic, we see no reason why the New 
Jersey Supreme Court would adopt a different 
interpretation of the language, given the fact that the 
phrases in the two Insuring Agreements are identical, and 
our reasoning in Jefferson Bank supports an application of 
the proximate causation standard in this context. 
Accordingly, we hold, in accordance with our reasoning in 
Jefferson Bank, that the phrase "losses resulting directly 
from" requires, for purposes of indemnification, that the 
losses be "proximately caused by" the fraudulent or 
dishonest acts of the employee which form the basis for the 
insured's coverage claim. 
 
As previously mentioned, the district court, following 
Lustig, held that there was evidence suggesting that the 
dishonest and fraudulent acts were the cause in fact of the 
Northwest loan loss. The court stated that there was 
evidence suggesting that the extensions and additional 
loans, at the very least, "enhanced" the losses City Federal 
suffered. Op. at 23. Thus, it appears from the language it 
used that the district court applied a less-demanding 
standard of causation than that which we have adopted 
today. See Jefferson Bank, 965 F.2d at 1281 n.10. 
 
Nevertheless, we do not believe that the district court's 
error in this regard necessitates reversal of the district 
court's conclusion that there were genuine issues of 
material fact concerning the question of causation 
presented on the facts of this case. Indeed, we agree with 
the district court's ultimate finding that a jury must 
determine the cause of the Northwest loss that City Federal 
sustained, and in particular, whether those specific 
dishonest and fraudulent acts upon which the RTC bases 
its claim of indemnification proximately caused the loss. 
Under New Jersey tort law, which we find instructive on the 
proximate cause analysis required under the bond, see 
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Jefferson Bank, 965 F.2d at 1281, "a proximate cause need 
not be the sole cause of harm. It suffices if it is a 
substantial contributing factor to the harm suffered." Perez 
v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1261 (N.J. 1999); see 
also Jefferson Bank, 965 F.2d at 1281 (stating that under 
Pennsylvania law, a cause is proximate if it is merely a 
substantial cause of the harm) (citations and quotation 
marks omitted). Based on the record before us, we cannot 
find, as a matter of law, that a jury could not conclude that 
the employees' actions were a substantial factor in bringing 
about the Northwest loan loss that eventually resulted. 
Allowing the jury to decide the issue of proximate cause is 
consistent with New Jersey's approach to resolving 
causation issues. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1261 (citing Martin 
v. Bengue, Inc., 136 A.2d 626 (N.J. 1957)). 
 
We further point out that in reaching our conclusion on 
the causation issue, we are unpersuaded by F&D's 
suggestion that as the non-movant at summary judgment 
proceedings, the RTC had to produce evidence 
demonstrating that the Northwest loan loss would have 
been avoided if the employees' misconduct had not 
occurred. Importantly, F&D's position in this regard is 
premised on cases which are not on point factually and fail 
to address the relevant legal concept here--that of 
proximate causation. Indeed, it appears from its brief that 
F&D's argument conflates the tort concepts of proximate 
causation and lack of compensable injury. See  Br. at 56-59 
(citing Midwest, 4 F.3d at 524; Stromberger, 990 F.2d at 
976-77; Citibank, 968 F.2d at 1495; W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 41, at 265 (5th ed. 
1984)). Given this analytical flaw, F&D has not persuaded 
us that the facts pertaining to the issue of proximate 
causation are so one-sided so as to require judgment as a 
matter of law in its favor. See Jefferson Bank , 965 F.2d at 
1285 (finding genuine issue of material fact concerning 
whether forged signature proximately caused loss where the 
evidence suggested that the bank would have refused to 
enter the transaction had not an individual purporting to 
be a notary signed the instrument); accord Lustig, 961 F.2d 
at 1167-68 (finding that relevant question pertaining to 
causation issue was whether "the loan committee relied on 
[the employee's] misrepresentations in making at least some 
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of the disputed loans," and determined that there were 
material disputed issues of fact on that point; court stated 
that the bond "does not require the bank to rule out all 
reasons the loan was not repaid before it can obtain 
coverage"). Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's 
ruling on the causation issue, as we see no basis for 
concluding, as a matter of law, that the dishonest and 
fraudulent actions did not cause the Northwest loss. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, we have 
determined that the district court erred in determining that 
no reasonable jury could conclude that City Federal 
"discovered" the covered loss prior to the expiration of the 
bond period. Moreover, for the reasons stated, we cannot 
affirm on the alternative ground that, as a matter of law, 
the loss City Federal sustained was not covered by the 
plain language of the bond's fidelity provision. Accordingly, 
we will reverse the district court's order entered January 
29, 1998, and remand the matter to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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